A Critique of Scanlon on the Scope of Morality by Elmore, Benjamin
145
Between the SpecieS
Volume 24, Issue 1
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Summer 2021
A Critique of Scanlon on 




In this essay, I argue that contractualism, even when it is actually 
used to construe our moral duties towards non-human animals, does 
not do so naturally. We can infer from our experiences with com-
panion animals that we owe moral duties towards them because of 
special relationships we are in with them. We can further abstract 
that we owe general moral duties to non-human animals because 
they are the kinds of beings that we can have relationships with, and 
because of the capacities that make possible this relational capacity. 
This type of approach better explains our duties towards non-human 
animals and other non-rational beings than does the trustee account 
that Scanlon leaves room for in his contractualism. This relational 
account of moral duty will only apply to non-human animals with the 
requisite capacities, but this includes common companion animals. 
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Introduction
In this paper, I will evaluate T.M. Scanlon’s account of the 
scope of morality in his version of contractualism. I will argue 
that Scanlon’s own view of whom we owe moral duties to is 
too narrow, wrongly excluding non-human animals. Moreover, 
his trustee account, both in the case of non-human animals (if 
applied to them), and of humans who lack judgment-sensitive 
attitudes, is not the most plausible account of our moral duties 
to them in themselves. I will develop an account according to 
which we owe moral duties to non-rational beings because of 
relationships we have with them, the capacity they have to form 
relationships, and the capacities that undergird the capacity to 
form relationships.
Scanlon’s Account of Moral Duty
Scanlon’s account of the scope of morality is focused on 
what is required for a being to be the kind of thing which can 
be wronged (Scanlon 1998, 179).We can wrong others if they 
are the type of beings to which it makes sense for us to jus-
tify ourselves. The general form of this justification is that we 
treat such beings “…only in ways that would be allowed by 
principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they, 
too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other 
rational creatures could not reasonably reject” (Scanlon 1998, 
106).
Violating the formula here is not meant to be the only way 
in which one can do something morally wrong. This is because 
there is moral wrongness in the broad sense in which “…some 
form of conduct is open to a serious moral objection of some 
kind” (Scanlon 1998, 178). One important way in which a thing 
can be wrong in the broad sense is if it unjustifiably causes a 
sentient being to experience pain (Scanlon 1998, 181). In caus-
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ing a sentient being pain, we have done something which we 
have prima facie reason not to do, because pain is bad. Scan-
lon’s view, however, is that in doing something wrong in this 
broad sense, we have not wronged a being itself. We have not 
violated a duty we owe to that being qua other.
Sentience, i.e. the ability to experience pain and pleasure, is 
not a sufficient condition for owing a moral duty to a being in 
itself, because the being that merely has sentience does not have 
“judgment-sensitive attitudes” (Scanlon 1998, 180). Judgment-
sensitive attitudes are defined as attitudes that it makes sense to 
offer or require justificatory reasons for having (Scanlon 1998, 
20). Paradigm cases of such attitudes seem to be beliefs and 
intentions to act in certain ways, but Scanlon also includes at-
titudes such as hopes and fears under the umbrella. A being 
without judgment-sensitive attitudes is not the kind of thing to 
which it makes sense for us to have to justify ourselves, so we 
cannot wrong it in itself.
Non-human Animals
A crucial question for Scanlon’s account of moral wrong-
ness, in the strict sense of what we owe to others qua other, is 
whether or not non-human animals are owed duties in them-
selves. Intuitively, it seems that we do owe duties to non-human 
animals. As Scanlon acknowledges, in the case of torturing a 
non-human animal it “…may seem wrong in a sense that goes 
beyond the idea that pain is a bad thing: it is something for 
which we should feel guilty to the animal itself, just as we can 
feel guilt to a human being” (Scanlon 1998, 182). Reasons for 
feeling this way in the case of companion animals include ca-
pacities we attribute to them for “…mutual expectation, recip-
rocated affection, and emotions such as disappointment, anger, 
and even resentment” (Scanlon 1998, 182). Such capacities, as 
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Scanlon acknowledges, seem much more sophisticated than 
mere sentience.
Given such considerations, Scanlon allows that his contrac-
tualism can account for duties we owe to non-human animals 
themselves, if we choose to utilize it in this way. This allow-
ance posits a trustee account, according to which non-human 
animals are represented by trustees who can stand in their 
place and judge principles for them (Scanlon 1998, 183). If the 
trustees can reasonably reject principles that endorse certain 
treatment of non-human animals, then those principles are to 
be rejected.
Although Scanlon allows that such an extension of his ac-
count is consistent with it, he himself does not endorse it. 
Rather, he thinks we can account for our required treatment of 
non-human animals in the broader sense of the moral wrong-
ness of pain (Scanlon 1998, 184). As a result, the reasons that 
non-human animals provide us with are impersonal rather than 
personal reasons (Scanlon 1998, 219). Non-human animals are 
sentient, and thus valuable, so it is wrong in the general sense 
that we cause them pain. But the value of non-human animals 
does not directly affect the moral duties we owe to others. Non-
human animals are not themselves a locus to which we can 
owe moral duties, so the only way their value can affect moral 
duties to others is indirect. For example, if someone wants to 
live in a way that respects the impersonal value of non-human 
animals, say, by not letting them suffer when they can be aided, 
then this person can reasonably reject principles that would re-
quire not taking this impersonal value into account (Scanlon 
1998, 221). It is denied, however, that we can reasonably re-
ject principles that permit one to fail to take into account the 
value of non-human animals (and other impersonally valuable 
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things). This caveat is presumably meant to protect one’s lib-
erty of conscience. There are other types of impersonally valu-
able things, such as the Grand Canyon, which, it would seem, 
we ought not be required to treat as valuable in our lives, at 
least insofar as our disregard for its value does not involve our 
depriving others of valuable ways of living, such as by destroy-
ing the Grand Canyon, thus depriving others of the ability to 
experience its grandeur.
There seem to be two reasons for supposing we do not 
owe moral duties to non-human animals. First, the trustee ac-
count itself appeals exclusively to the rejection of principles 
that cause non-human animals pain, which makes the practi-
cal difference between the broader and stricter sense of moral 
wrongness very minimal, and thus unnecessary. Secondly, the 
moral status of humans is significantly different than that of 
non-human animals, even in the case of infants, children, and 
the disabled (Scanlon 1998, 185).
The second reason requires a bit of explanation. Human be-
ings generally have the capacity to form judgement-sensitive 
attitudes. To better understand why it is denied that we owe 
duties to non-human animals, it will help to better understand 
what judgment-sensitive attitudes are, or at least what Scanlon 
has in mind when using the term. To this end, it is helpful to 
consider Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of “reasons for ac-
tion” (MacIntyre 1999, 53-61). Against the rather implausible 
view that non-human animals cannot have reasons because 
giving reasons is necessary for having reasons, and giving rea-
sons requires the possession of a language, MacIntyre, follow-
ing Aquinas, argues that non-human animals do have reasons. 
According to MacIntyre: 
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Nonhuman animals are, he [Aquinas] allowed, “moved 
by precepts” and on occasion learn from past experi-
ence to recognize this or that as a friendly or hostile. In 
virtue of their nature and of such capacity for learning 
as they have, they are able to make what Aquinas calls 
“natural judgments.” So they do exhibit what Aquinas 
calls “a semblance of reason” and “they share in” what 
he calls “natural prudence” (MacIntyre 1999, 55).
Non-human animals do have reasons that guide their ac-
tions. But, according to MacIntyre, humans have the further 
rational capacity of being able to reflect upon their reasons for 
action and make judgments about them. In order for one to 
have judgment-sensitive attitudes in Scanlon’s sense, the claim 
seems to be that the further rational capacity of reflecting upon 
one’s reasons is necessary. If a being cannot reflect upon its 
reasons for action, then it makes no sense to require them to 
justify their reasons for action, or to justify our reasons for 
actions to them. Because we cannot justify ourselves to non-
human animals, or require justification from them, we do not 
owe justification to them, nor they to us. Because we do not 
owe justification to them, we do not owe moral duties to them.
 Infants, young children, and the disabled do not have this 
capacity.  Infants and young children, however, will normally 
development such a capacity, and thus are said to not be “sepa-
rate kinds of creatures” from adults who currently have this 
capacity (Scanlon 1998, 185). The case of the disabled, par-
ticularly those who never develop the capacity for having 
judgment-sensitive attitudes, may seem a bit trickier. Scanlon, 
however, thinks that we “clearly do” have reason to treat the 
severely disabled as his account requires for others who are 
merely biologically human (Scanlon 1998, 185). The reason is 
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that such beings are born to humans. The relation of being born 
to humans is said to provide a strong reason for applying the 
trustee account to such humans, even if the trustee account 
does not apply to non-human animals. Counterfactually, such 
humans would be able to reasonably reject certain principles, 
so they have the moral status required for being owed duties 
in themselves. The idea seems to be that, since the severely 
disabled are born human, they would have normally been the 
types of beings which would have developed the requisite fac-
ulties, even though that is not how it turned out. Non-human 
animals, however, do not normally develop such faculties, so 
they are denied such robust moral status. Being biologically 
human thus suffices for being owed moral duties, a fact that is 
denied as being a case of the prejudice known as speciesism. 
If, however, being biologically human, i.e. being a member of 
the human species, suffices for being owed moral duties, quite 
apart from one’s actual or future capacities, then I agree with 
Matthew Talbert that Scanlon’s denial of speciesism falls flat 
(Talbert 2006, 210).
Companion Animals and Relationships
Scanlon himself provides some of the material for believ-
ing he is mistaken about denying moral duties to non-human 
animals in the discussion of companion animals. As was men-
tioned above, we generally take companion animals to be capa-
ble of reciprocal affection, expectation, and rich emotions such 
as disappointment, anger, sadness, etc. These capacities are re-
lational capacities, i.e. those that make it possible for us to have 
rich relationships with non-human animals. In attributing these 
capacities to non-human animals, experience seems clearly to 
affirm that we are correct. When the human of a companion 
animal is in pain or perceivably harassed or assaulted by an-
other person, it is known through experience that, say, a dog, 
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can rush to its human in order to comfort them, or attack or 
bark at the assailant. No doubt this has to do with the fact that 
the human has shown affection to the dog over the years in pet-
ting them, providing food and shelter, and playing with them. 
A bond has been formed that influences how both the dog and 
the human behave.
If the human were, say, to kick the dog in the teeth, this ac-
tion will seem to violate a duty to the dog not merely because 
it will cause the dog pain, but because it will violate the rela-
tionship that has been formed. The trustee can thus reject prin-
ciples that would endorse or allow the violation of the relation-
ship of reciprocal affection and mutual expectation between 
the dog and its owner. Such an explanation, moreover, seems to 
not only apply in the case of direct harms such as striking one’s 
companion animal, but also in the case of failures to aid them.
Those who have had dogs in their family know that they 
can ask us to do things for them. Dogs can know where the 
leash is kept, and can gesture in the direction of the leash, and 
then look back at the owner. The action indicates a desire to go 
for a walk. This is also done when the dog knows where their 
canned food or other treats are. It is also well known that dogs 
will whine to be let outside, or to be petted. In doing these 
things, the dog is requesting something of their owner with 
the expectation that the request will be fulfilled. If the owner 
fails to fulfill such requests, especially without good reason, 
then they will plausibly have wronged the dog because of the 
established relationship, not merely because it will foreclose 
on the dog’s experience of pleasure, or cause distress. Moral 
principles that endorse or allow such neglect will be rejected 
by the trustees of dogs.
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Scanlon provides us with a way of knowing this to be the 
case. Scanlon posits what he calls a remorse test which we can 
use to show us to whom we owe moral duties and in what way 
we owe them (Scanlon 2017, 15-16). In the case of humans, 
when we wrong them, we feel a kind of remorse over the fact 
that “…an individual who is affected by our action has a rea-
son for objecting to it that cannot be answered satisfactorily” 
(Scanlon 2017, 16).  In the case of companion animals, many 
of us have a feeling of remorse when we harm or neglect them 
that indicates to us that we have wronged them. For example, 
when I am in a bad mood and yell at my dog over a trivial 
matter, I feel that I have wronged her, and try to make it up to 
her through petting or a treat. The feeling of remorse in this 
case can perhaps, to some people, be neutral over the ques-
tion of owing duties to our companion animals, and thus not be 
necessarily tied to a trustee account. But the feeling of having 
wronged our beloved companion animals in themselves rather 
than in a general, detached way, is potent evidence to us that 
we do in fact owe duties to them.
It will, of course, be objected to my use of the remorse test 
that not everyone feels this way when they yell at their compan-
ion animals, or otherwise violate their relationships with them. 
I do have an error theory here. In my view, when humans do 
not feel that they owe moral duties to their companion animals 
(or non-human animals more generally, as will be made clear 
later), it is because of anthropocentric cultural biases that have 
influenced them, either in their generally unreflective moral 
judgments, or in their reflective acceptance of an account of 
morality that denies moral duties to non-human animals. These 
are biases that should in fact be rejected.
Benjamin Elmore
154
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
Violations of the relationships we have with non-human 
animals do in fact provoke experiences of disappointment, 
betrayal, or sadness in them. We can, for example, see dogs 
sulking around. Such capacities are far more sophisticated than 
merely having the ability to experience pain. This is why we 
are capable of forming relationships with non-human animals 
that are obligating of us. I do not want to deny, however, that 
sentience itself is an important capacity that, combined with 
an undefined number of other capacities, allows us to form re-
lationships with non-human animals. Nor do I want to deny 
that sentience is enough to impose moral duties on us towards 
non-human animals. 
In fact, I agree with Christine Korsgaard that in having in 
common with non-human animals the state of being a con-
scious animal, we have in common being someone with them 
(Korsgaard 1996, 153). Moreover, Korsgaard is quite right that 
in experiencing physical pain, non-human animals perceive a 
reason for action to relieve that pain (a threat to their physical 
identity), and the recognition of this pain causes further emo-
tional pain, and these give rise to cries (and other behaviors) 
from which we perceive such reasons. As Korsgaard says, we 
perceive the reasons in these cries through pity, and they im-
pose moral duties on us to the animals themselves to relieve 
this pain. I think what Korsgaard says here is similar to an 
adoption of Scanlon’s remorse test. If we failed to aid non-hu-
man animals in pain, we would experience remorse that indi-
cates moral duties towards them that have been violated. It is 
not clear, however, that sentience in this sense (combined with 
the ability to express distress) occurs divorced from other ca-
pacities that jointly make non-human animals capable of hav-
ing rich relationships with us. If it did, perhaps it would still be 
enough to impose moral duties on us towards them. So, even if 
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Scanlon were correct about pain being the only type of thing 
the experience of which trustees could object to in rejecting 
principles in the stead of non-human animals, it seems that the 
trustee account would still be preferable over construing the 
moral status of non-human animals in the broad sense.
An excellent point that Talbert makes about Scanlon’s con-
tractualism is that the broader theory is like the trustee account 
in that it involves positing a type of ideal rationality in other 
normal adult humans that they may not have, essentially treat-
ing them as their own trustees (Talbert 2006, 212-213). Scan-
lon’s theory does not depend on humans actually reasonably 
rejecting the principles of our actions for them to be wrong. 
Rather, we think about which principles they could in fact rea-
sonably reject if they were sufficiently thoughtful. This means 
that contractualism is not generally based on the actual exer-
cise of judgment-sensitive attitudes, but being aware of the in-
terests that others have from their own viewpoint. Talbert takes 
this as further reason to construe non-human animals as being 
included within those to whom we owe moral duties, because, 
like Korsgaard says, they do have interests. I agree with Tal-
bert that it is arbitrary to use the trustee account specifically, 
or contractualism more generally, to account for the moral du-
ties we owe to humans, but deny such duties to nonhuman ani-
mals. I will further argue, however, that contractualism does 
not adequately account for many of our moral duties to non-
rational beings, so we have to go beyond it. The capacities that 
the trustee account would have to take into consideration are 
tied instead, in many cases, into my hierarchical, relational ac-
count of moral duty.
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Non-human Animals More Generally
Given the discussion of capacities to form relationships with 
us that non-human animals have, we should go further and 
say that it is not only an actually established relationship we 
have with non-human animals that imposes moral duties on 
us towards them. Rather, the capacities that give non-human 
animals the capacity to form relationships, and this further ca-
pacity itself, impose moral duties on us to treat non-human ani-
mals in certain ways. This allows us to extend duties we owe to 
non-human animals beyond those owed to companion animals. 
Indeed, it would seem rather arbitrary to say our companion 
animals are owed duties, whereas others just like them but not 
in such relationships are not owed duties.
Scanlon’s own discussion of friendship can help us see one 
reason why it is problematic to afford moral duties to our com-
panion animals but not to non-human animals with similar ca-
pacities that the former have. Scanlon considers the case of a 
friend who is willing to steal a kidney from another person 
in order to aid you (Scanlon 1998, 164-165). In such a case, 
the victim of the theft is the same type of being which you 
yourself are, but your friend is willing to treat them in ways 
that you yourself would not want to be treated as that type of 
being. This shows that your friend does not afford moral status 
to you for what you are, but only because “he happens to like 
you” (Scanlon 1998, 165). If you were to lose favor in the sight 
of your friend, he might just as easily do whatever he wants to 
you, which seems to imply a fundamental lack of respect for 
you. The case seems parallel to that of companion animals, 
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We generally treat dogs well (at least in many parts of the 
world), but animals such as pigs, who are commonly thought to 
be of comparable, perhaps even greater intelligence than dogs, 
exist, for the most part, only to be preyed upon by us in our 
societies. We even feed pigs to our dogs in food and chew toys. 
Pigs could just as easily have been our companion animals (and 
sometimes are) if history had unfolded differently, and dogs 
could be our food (as they are in some parts of the world). Our 
historically contingent different treatment of these two types 
of non-human animals seems very arbitrary from a moral point 
of view. It seems at face value to indicate that we value dogs 
because we happen to like them, but not because they are the 
kinds of beings capable of having these types of relationships 
with us. Dogs themselves are unaware of this fact, but we can 
be aware of it.
I do not think that this is quite correct. I think our relation-
ships with dogs (and other companion animals) allow us to 
recognize, at least implicitly, that the kinds of capacities that 
they have afford them moral status in a more than broad sense. 
I think the problem is that we do not reflect on this fact suf-
ficiently enough, and thus fail to extend our moral duties to 
other animals with similar capacities. We thus practically treat 
our companion animals in ways that Scanlon’s organ-stealing 
friend treats us, but on reflection, we would, I hope, be more 
likely to change our behavior. In so doing we will treat all non-
human animals with the requisite relational capacities in ways 
that they deserve, including even our own companion animals, 
whom we often love like  human members of our families.
Impersonal Reasons Revisited
Another objection to Scanlon’s view of the moral status of 
non-human animals lies in his discussion, mentioned above, of 
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impersonal and personal reasons. Since Scanlon does not favor 
the trustee account, but rather the approach of construing the 
moral status of non-human animals in the broader sense, they 
only give us impersonal reasons. This means that the reasons 
non-human animals give us cannot directly allow us to reject 
principles. A very troubling, implausible consequence of this 
view is that it puts non-human animals in the same general 
moral category as inanimate objects like the Grand Canyon, 
forests, or monuments. To be sure, non-human animals could 
still be said to be more valuable than such things, but their val-
ue is still the source of the same general, impersonal type of 
reason.
It seems, however, that because non-human animals are so 
different from inanimate objects, they should not be construed 
as giving the same general type of reason. This is particularly 
poignant when considering the fact that Scanlon does not allow 
the rejection of principles on the grounds that they permit us 
to fail to regard or treat as valuable that which is valuable. It 
is implausible that we do not owe it to each other to treat non-
human animals well, because, as Korsgaard’s remarks indicate, 
non-human animals themselves are part of the “each other.” 
They are “someone,” not merely fixtures of our environment. 
Scanlon’s discussion of personal and impersonal reasons does 
not honor this fact.
Infants, Children, and the Disabled
Now consider Scanlon’s treatment of infants, children, and 
the severely disabled. As indicated, the account of our duties to 
such humans is essentially that they belong to a species, mem-
bers of which normally develop judgment-sensitive attitudes, 
even though they may in fact lack this. Because of their mem-
bership in this species, the trustee account is to be applied to 
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them. But is this species-membership plausibly why we do in 
fact owe duties to such beings? I think not. If, for example, I 
have a mentally challenged son, and he comes up to me, ges-
turing that I make him a sandwich, the primary reasons why I 
should refrain from hitting him in the face in response, or sim-
ply ignoring him, do not seem much different than the case of 
non-human animals. I have an obligating relationship with him 
to refrain from harming him, and to actually aid him, and the 
fact that he is capable of being in such a relationship with me, 
seems to ground my moral duties towards him in himself. The 
consideration that he belongs to a species that normally devel-
ops judgment-sensitive attitudes, even though he lacks them, 
seems rather weak. If it is acknowledged that such consider-
ations as I have suggested apply in this case do in fact apply, 
then it is incredibly arbitrary to deny that they also apply in the 
case of non-human animals. So, the primary reasons we have 
to think we have moral duties to the disabled and children seem 
to also be reasons to think the same of non-human animals. 
Is There Room for the Trustee Account and 
Contractualism Generally?
Another point is that, at least in many cases, the trustee ac-
count itself seems superfluous to add for those particular cas-
es. It seems plausible that we do not need to appeal to principles 
trustees for non-human animals, children, or the severely dis-
abled would reasonably reject in order to account for many of 
our moral duties towards such beings, nor does such an ac-
count naturally provide such grounds. Rather, relationships, 
the capacity to form relationships, and the capacities that un-
dergird this capacity, seem to be what imposes moral duties on 
us towards these beings in themselves. It may be objected here 
that in focusing on the continuity between non-human animals 
and humans my account fails to take into consideration the 
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real differences between the two. The fact that we may justify 
ourselves to one another adds a dimension of moral obligation 
not present in the case of non-human animals (Ashford and 
Mulgan, 2018). My account is consistent with this objection, 
so long as we do not make the distinction too sharp. It seems 
that non-human animals are the kinds of beings to whom we 
owe moral duties, and the ways in which we do seem to be the 
primary ways we have moral duties to infants, children, and 
the severely disabled as well. Scanlon’s contractualism affords 
moral status in the narrow sense of what we owe to each other 
to all of these beings in a rather farfetched, weak way. 
Should the same be said of the moral duties we have to hu-
mans more generally? No, I think contractualism does in fact 
have a legitimate contribution to make in the case of normal 
adult humans. As Scanlon points out, we do not generally think 
that it is problematic to interfere in the goal-directed activity 
of non-human animals, unless some further morally objection-
able action is thus committed in doing this (Scanlon 1998, 184). 
Non-human animals, lacking robust rationality, may legiti-
mately have their behavior altered by us for their greater good, 
such as through training them not to run in the road. Moreover, 
we can do things such as put heart-worm medication in their 
food, or have them spayed or neutered, without their knowl-
edge or consent, and not be morally blameworthy for this. In 
the case of normal adult humans, if we kidnapped them and 
had them spayed or neutered, or put medication in their food 
without their consent, we would have committed actions which 
act according to principles that could reasonably be rejected. 
Normal adult humans may reasonably reject principles that al-
low their own wills to be manipulated or completely ignored. 
Accepting Talbert’s construal of contractualism more gener-
ally as being akin to the trustee model, we can say here that 
Benjamin Elmore
161
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
normal adult humans have different “needs and interests” than 
nonhuman animals and other humans, i.e. to not be manipu-
lated or treated unduly paternalistically ( Talbert 2006, 213).
This discussion leaves room for the possibility that contrac-
tualism, while not necessary or natural for construing many of 
the moral duties we owe to non-rational beings, could be used 
for other duties towards them. Such duties are paternalistic du-
ties. We have duties to perform actions that are for the greater 
good of non-rational beings, especially when in relationships 
with them. In the case of infants and children, for example, we 
have to teach and shape them with an eye towards what they 
will become. Since they will become members of the moral 
community, the ways in which we shape them can plausibly be 
required to pass the test of not being tied to principles that can 
reasonably be rejected by members of the moral community. 
For example, a principle that allows us to teach our children to 
be racists can be reasonably rejected because, as future mem-
bers of the moral community, they have a stake in becoming 
morally good rather than morally vicious people.
Moral Pluralism
As is clear in the preceding discussion, Scanlon himself 
views morality, and moral wrongness itself, in a pluralistic way. 
There are things which are wrong in the broad sense of being 
subject to serious moral objection, and things which wrong be-
ings themselves which are “others” to whom we owe moral du-
ties. My account further splits moral wrongness in the latter 
sense. We owe moral duties to non-human animals and other 
non-rational beings because of the relationships we have with 
them, their capacities for these relationships, and the capacities 
that undergird such capacities for relationships. This way of 
construing moral duty will also apply to rational beings insofar 
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as they have in common relational capacities with non-rational 
beings. There is a further grounds for moral duty that contrac-
tualism may provide in the case of members of the rational, 
moral community, as well as the case of future members of the 
moral community. The latter way of construing moral duties is 
not in itself good enough to naturally account for all moral du-
ties we owe to others, even when its advocates want to try to do 
this. The resulting picture is less parsimonious than Scanlon’s 
own account, but as he himself rightly says, “It would be a 
mistake to ignore judgments that we in fact take to be relevant 
just for the sake of greater neatness in our thinking” (Scanlon 
1998, 99).
The Nature of Relationships and Capacities
Throughout the paper I have discussed relationships, the ca-
pacity for relationships, and the capacities that undergird the 
capacity for relationships that impose moral duties upon us. 
In this section, I will clarify these concepts. First, by relation-
ships, I have in mind what Shelly Kagan calls a special re-
lationship that imposes upon us a special obligation (Kagan 
1998, 126). In taking a non-human animal into our care, we 
voluntarily accept a special obligation that does not apply to 
others who do not have this particular relationship with our 
particular companion animal. As time goes on, the relation-
ship between human and companion animal deepens through 
shared experiences and affection, making transgressions of the 
relationship seem more heinous. The companion animal learns 
to depend upon their human for food, security, play, and af-
fection. They become distressed when their human leaves the 
home, especially for prolonged periods, and display clear signs 
of excitement, such as jumping in the air and running around 
the house when their human returns. This reciprocal affection 
is similar to that between humans and other humans.
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The capacity to form relationships depends upon a cluster 
of other capacities. Some of these capacities may be present 
without enough of them to constitute the ability to form rela-
tionships. As mentioned, Korsgaard’s discussion of pain, the 
recognition of pain, and the expression of pain (which clearly 
does not require human language) gives us some material here. 
Another important example is what MacIntyre calls the, “…
conceptual capacity that makes language possible, what Hei-
degger calls “the as-structure”” (MacIntyre 1999, 46). The “as-
structure” is the ability to conceptualize one’s environment in 
such a way as to be able to recognize certain entities in it as 
distinct things, or kinds of things. MacIntyre attributes this ca-
pacity to dogs, higher primates, and dolphins, although lower 
animals of various kinds may lack it. This capacity is important 
in relationships because it allows, say, dogs to recognize their 
humans. Without the as-structure, any “relationship” would be 
a one-way street so to speak. But it is not clear that this capacity 
is a necessary condition of having an obligating special rela-
tionship. For example, elderly parents or grandparents stricken 
by Alzheimer’s may not be able to recognize their family mem-
bers in any significant way (Bernstein 1997, 56). Even so, we 
still take ourselves to have an obligating relationship with our 
parent or grandparent. This capacity in non-human animals is 
weaker than in humans. Non-human animals cannot, for exam-
ple, classify things in metaphysical categories and recognize 
them as belonging to such categories, among other limitations 
(MacIntyre 1999, 47). This does not mean, however, that the 
as-structure is missing altogether. With it, non-human animals, 
to use a previous example, are able to be distressed at the ab-
sence of their humans and joyed at their return. 
The capacities that give non-human animals the capacity for 
relationships, and this capacity itself, obligate humans in a gen-
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eral rather than a special way. As obligating in a general way, 
they impose moral obligations on all beings capable of having 
moral obligations. In Kagan’s terms, they are “owed by every-
one to everyone…” (Kagan 1998, 127). So my account aims to 
explain both types of moral obligations we owe to non-human 
animals in themselves. Perhaps there are further reasons for 
believing we have moral obligations to non-human animals 
(and other non-rational beings). If so, I welcome them. Giving 
non-human animals as robust moral status as plausible (taking 
differences among different species into account) is a much-
needed antidote to the many centuries of anthropocentrism we 
have inflicted upon them.
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